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According to the evolutionary game theory principle, a strategy representing a higher payoff can spread
among competitors. But there are cases when a player consistently overestimates or underestimates her own
payoff, which undermines proper comparison. Interestingly, both underconfident and overconfident individuals
are capable of elevating the cooperation level significantly. While former players stimulate a local coordination
of strategies, the presence of overconfident individuals enhances the spatial reciprocity mechanism. In both cases
the propagations of competing strategies are influenced in a biased way resulting in a cooperation supporting
environment. These effects are strongly related to the nonlinear character of invasion probabilities which is a
common and frequently observed feature of microscopic dynamics.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
The basic idea of evolutionary game theory is to consider
payoff as fitness, and higher payoff in the game is translated
into reproductive success. Hence, due to natural selection,
more successful strategies reproduce faster while those strate-
gies which are less successful become extinct [1]. This mi-
croscopic dynamic assumes an accurate comparison of payoff
values which help competitors to navigate toward a better evo-
lutionary outcome.
Interestingly, however, we can observe examples in real
life situations when individuals tend to misinterpret their own
payoff values perpetually hence the estimation of payoff dif-
ference can be easily misleading. Overconfidence, believ-
ing more about themselves than they are in reality, could be
a source of biased belief [2]. But underconfident players,
who believe less about themselves, make decisions based on
incorrect perception, too. Indeed, the possible evolutionary
advantage of overconfidence in resource competition games
has already been revealed by previous works [3, 4]. The
main conclusion of these works was that overconfidence could
be beneficial because it encourages individuals to claim re-
sources they could not otherwise win. Secondly, overconfi-
dence keeps these competitors from walking away from con-
flicts they would probably win.
But what if all players are overconfident or all players are
underconfident when they estimate their own achievement?
One may expect that if all members commit the same error
of perception then there is no relevant change from the view-
point of evolutionary dynamics. In this work we focus on this
question by considering the fundamental problem of coopera-
tion [5]. Here cooperator and defector strategies compete and
to defect would always provide a higher individual income
against a cooperator, but mutual cooperation would offer the
optimal income for the whole community. In the last decades
several cooperator supportingmechanismswere identified [6],
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including reward [7–11] or punishment [12–17], population
heterogeneity [18–20], player’s mobility [21, 22], conformity
[23, 24] and tolerance [25, 26], which could be helpful to
avoid the tragedy of the common state when everyone chooses
the tempting defection [27].
In this work we will not assume any sophisticated environ-
mental feedback mechanism [28–30] or demanding cognitive
skill about players [31–36], but only explore the plain conse-
quence of perception error collectively made by group mem-
bers. To reveal the interaction between strategies and individ-
ual skills we consider a coevolutionary model [37–41] where
players may not only imitate a more successful strategy but
also adopt the way to consider individual achievement when
making decisions. In particular, besides individuals who are
performing unbiased estimation of their payoff values we also
assume the initial presence of over- and underconfident play-
ers and monitor the coevolutionary process. Interestingly, be-
ing overconfident not only ensures individual advantage but
could also be beneficial for the whole community if every-
one follows the same trait. Furthermore, a higher cooperation
level can also be reached when all members of the popula-
tion are underconfident regarding their own success. These
observations can be explained dynamically by a modified mi-
croscopic process which has a biased consequence on strategy
propagations.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We first present
the definition of our model in the next section. We then pro-
ceed with the presentation of our main results and their expla-
nations. This is followed by our conclusions and a discussion
of their implications in the last section.
II. COEVOLUTION OF PERCEPTION AND PLAYER
STRATEGIES
Starting from the traditional prisoner’s dilemma game we
assume that unconditional cooperator and defector players are
distributed on a graph. For simplicity we use a square lattice
interaction graph, but we stress that our observations remain
valid for other types of interaction networks.
To capture the essence of a social conflict we adopt the sim-
2plified parametrization of weak prisoner’s dilemma game [42]
where the only parameter is the temptation to defect T , while
reward for mutual cooperation provides R = 1 payoff. The
punishment P for mutual defection as well as the sucker’s
payoff S of a cooperator facing a defector are equal to 0.
The evolution of the competing strategies is performed in
accordance with the following elementary steps. First, a ran-
domly selected player x acquires its payoff Πx by playing
the game with all its kx neighbors. Next, a randomly cho-
sen neighbor of x, denoted by y, also acquires its payoff Πy
by playing the game with all its ky neighbors. Last, player x
adopts the sy strategy of player y with a probability
Γ(sy → sx) = 1/{1 + exp[(Πx −Πy)/K]} , (1)
where K denotes the amplitude of noise that quantifies the
uncertainty of strategy adoptions [43, 44].
The only difference from the traditional model is we as-
sume that players may have different levels of self-deception
when they evaluate their own payoff values for pairwise com-
parison. For simplicity we establish three classes for self-
deception, which are underconfident (u), normal (n) and over-
confident (o) players. Traditionally, when normal players cal-
culate the imitation probability they apply an unbiased (or
accurate) payoff value for their own achievement. An over-
confident player x, however, believes more about her own
achievement than its properΠx value. Consequently, she will
use an enhanced Π′x = Πx(1 + α) payoff value to calcu-
late the imitation probability. Here parameter α describes the
level of overconfidence. Similarly, an underconfident player
x underestimates her own achievement and uses a reduced
Π′x = Πx(1 − α) value when imitation probability is calcu-
lated. For simplicity we use the same parameter to character-
ize the degree of biased self-deception to both directions. No-
tably, the self-deception level can also be adopted via a learn-
ing step with the same probability but the latter option is only
considered when players have different strategies. Otherwise,
the overconfident state would always enjoy an artificial ad-
vantage over other states even within a homogeneous-strategy
domain. Nevertheless, we note that the final cooperation level
remains intact if we allow the adoption of confidence level
between players with identical strategies. To summarize the
microscopic dynamics of our model a personal strategy and
confidence level can be adopted independently, but using the
same adoption probability which is based on the payoff differ-
ence of source and target players. In other words, it can hap-
pen that only a confidence level is adopted while the strategy
of target player remains unchanged, or only strategy invasion
happens, or both features are adopted simultaneously.
Technically we consider a six-strategymodel where besides
traditional or normal Cn and Dn players we also have over-
confident Co and Do players and underconfident Cu and Du
competitors. It is important to stress that the increase (de-
crease) of payoff for overconfident (underconfident) players
is conceptually different from the general perception error that
is captured via the noise parameter K . While perception er-
ror may emerge toward both directions and an ordinary player
sometimes may overestimate or underestimate payoff values,
but overconfident (underconfident) players tend to use biased
values always into one direction. The key parameters of our
coevolutionarymodel is the temptation T value which charac-
terizes the dilemma strength and the α value which describes
how biased the over- and underconfident players are.
Monte Carlo simulations of the game are carried out com-
prising the described coevolutionary steps. Each Monte Carlo
step (MCS) gives a chance for every player to adopt the strat-
egy and/or self-deception level of a randomly chosen neighbor
once on average. During the evolutionary process we moni-
tor both strategies and the fractions of different self-deception
levels. When regular interaction graphs were used (such as
square lattice or kagome lattice) the linear size of the system
was between L = 400 and L = 4000. The typical time to
reach a stationary state was 50000 MCSs, and we averaged
the stationary values over another 10000 steps. For hetero-
geneous graphs, like random or scale-free graphs, we used
N = 5000 nodes and generated 1000 independent graphs to
average the obtained values for the requested accuracy. As al-
ready noted, in the following we present the details of results
obtained mostly on a square grid, but conceptually similar re-
sults can be reached for other interaction graphs.
III. RESULTS
Before presenting our results for structured populations we
note that in a well-mixed, unstructured populationwhere play-
ers have random temporary connections the introduction of
biased confidence levels has no particular consequence. More
precisely, defector players always prevail for any T > 1 value
in agreement with the classical model [5]. Therefore a spa-
tially structured population, which is a rather realistic assump-
tion in several cases, is a fundamental condition for the re-
sults discussed below. As a general observation, overconfi-
dent players will always prevail in the whole population if we
wait long enough. This behavior, which agrees with the pre-
diction obtained for the resource competition game [3], is not
really surprising because these players are reluctant to adopt
the state of other competitors while normal and especially un-
derconfident players can do it more easily. But our principal
interest is to explore how the presence of players with biased
self-deception may influence the cooperation level. This point
could be specially interesting in the situation when both coop-
erators and defectors are overconfident and overestimate their
own achievements simultaneously.
The answer to this question can be found on the right-hand
side of Fig. 1 where we plotted the general cooperation level
on the T − α plane. This surface suggests that by using an
intermediateα value a significantly high cooperation level can
be reached even at a large temptation value where a normal
system would terminate onto a full defector state. Evidently, if
α is too large then players would evaluate their payoff values
too high, which would result in a frozen state (not shown in
Fig. 1). But staying at a moderate α the full collapse of the
cooperator state can be avoided, which means that a certain
level of overconfidence of all members could be useful for the
whole community.
Interestingly, not only overconfident but also underconfi-
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FIG. 1: Fraction of cooperators on T − α plane for a square lattice
atK = 0.1 in the case when only underconfident players are present
(left side, red lines) and in the case when only overconfident individ-
uals are present in the population (right side, blue lines). The latter
is also the evolutionary outcome of the general model when players
with different confidence levels compete for space. The cooperation
level for the normal system is marked by a thick black line at α = 0.
dent players can be useful for the whole community. If we
assume a uniform population where all players are undercon-
fident and underestimate their own payoff values then the co-
operation level can also be elevated comparing to the normal
system where every player estimates payoff values accurately.
This observation is summarized on the left-hand side of Fig. 1
where we again plotted cooperation level on the T − α plane,
which is the fraction of Cu players in this case. As for the
overcondfident case, here there is again an optimal intermedi-
ate α value which provides the highest cooperation level.
In Fig. 2 we compare the results of uniform populations
obtained at a fixed α value. These plots highlight that the pos-
itive consequence of biased self-deception is more visible at
high temptation values which would normally ensure a clear
advantage for defector players. Furthermore, an overconfident
population can do even better than an underconfident popula-
tion.
To collect deeper insights into the typical microscopic
mechanisms responsible for the coevolutionary process, we
present characteristic snapshots of evolution started from a
prepared initial state where all available states are present.
The whole evolution can be monitored in the animation we
provided [45] but the milestones of pattern formations are
described in the following. Figure 3 (a) shows the starting
state where players with different self-deception levels are dis-
tributed separately. In particular, underconfident cooperator
and defector players are arranged randomly in the left third
of the space. Overconfident players are initially distributed
on the right third, while normal players with unbiased self-
deception are in the center third. When evolution is launched
then sub-solutions emerge locally. More precisely, as shown
in Fig. 3 (b), the applied large temptation value prevents nor-
mal Cn cooperators to survive in the sea of normalDn defec-
tors. In biased populations, however, cooperators survive. As
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FIG. 2: Comparison of cooperation levels for uniform models when
players with a single-type confidence level are present in dependence
on temptation value at α = 0.2. In all cases players are staged on a
square lattice (L = 400) atK = 0.1.
the area marked by “I” illustrates,Cu players coexist withDu
defectors, and similarly Co cooperators form a solution with
Do defectors in the region marked by “II”. There is a visi-
ble difference between these two solutions, which will have a
greater importance as discussed below. In particular, Co play-
ers form compact domains in the sea of Do players while the
domains of Cu players are more irregular.
Due to periodic boundary conditions, overconfident players
can interact directly with underconfident players, shown by
area “III”, and the former solution prevails against the latter.
The stability of Cu+Du solutions is also jeopardized by nor-
mal players becauseDn invades the territory of Cu, as shown
by “IV ” in Fig. 3 (b). Because of the applied microscopic dy-
namic, which allows the adoption of self-deception level only
between players with different strategies, Dn and Du states
would coexist, as illustrated by “I” in Fig. 3 (c). This mix-
ture, however, is not stable because someCu players adopt the
self-deception level from Dn neighbor and the emerging Cn
state can easily spread in a Du domain and sweep them out
completely. This process is shown by “II” in panel (c). The
triumph of Cn, however is just temporary because neighbor-
ingDn players beat them, as it is explained previously. Sum-
ming up, albeit Dn and Du are neutral, but the former beats
the latter indirectly with the help of Cn players, who directly
invades Du and after becomes the prey of Dn. This pattern
formation resembles “the Moor has done his duty, the Moor
may go” effect that emerges in several multi-state ecological
systems [46, 47].
As we already noted at the beginning of this section, over-
confident players invade the whole populations. This invasion
can be seen clearly in Fig. 3 (d) where we marked both propa-
gation fronts of this domain. The front marked by “I” denotes
the irregular, but fast propagating overconfident→ undercon-
fident transition. Here both Co → Du andDo → Cu elemen-
tary steps assist the propagation. The front marked by “II”
separating normal and overconfident players is more regular,
but propagates much slower. Here only Co players can in-
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FIG. 3: Competition of possible solutions at T = 1.1, α = 0.2 on
a square lattice with L = 450 linear size. Different shade of blue
and red colors denote cooperator and defector players with different
self-deception levels as indicated by the legend on the top. Further
details are given in the main text. Snapshots were taken at 0, 200,
600, and 850MCSs.
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FIG. 4: Changes of invasion speeds detected via the development of
strategy concentrations when uniform systems are launched from a
random initial state on a L = 4000 square lattice at α = 0.2. In
panel (a) ∆ρC (under) and ∆ρD (under) show how the fractions of
cooperators and defectors change during elementary invasion steps
when we replace normal players by underconfident individuals. Sim-
ilarly,∆ρC (over) and ∆ρD (over) denote how the fraction of coop-
erators and defectors vary when we replace normal players by over-
confident competitors. Symbols connected by lines mark the leading
mechanisms for both cases which are responsible for the coopera-
tion supporting effects summarized in Fig. 1. Panel (b) shows the
resulting relative changes of strategies for all uniform models. This
comparison suggests that the advantage of defector strategy weakens
significantly for both underconfident and overconfident populations.
vadeDn territory first which is followed by the some invasion
between Do and Co players, which establishes the stable co-
existence of the latter states. Finally, not shown in Fig. 3, only
these two types of players remain alive.
To understand why biased populations support cooperation,
it is instructive to analyze the propagation processes within
uniform systems where players share the same self-deception
level. For this purpose we compare the strategy invasions in
three different uniform systems by using the same T, α pa-
rameter values when evolution is launched from a random
initial state. As expected, a random mixture of strategies al-
ways supports defector invasion better in the early stage, but
its intensity could be different for populations with different
self-deception levels. The simplest way to quantify the inten-
5sity of invasion is to measure how the fractions of strategies
change in time due to elementary invasion steps. For proper
comparison we measure how the success of specific invasion
steps change when we change the self-deception level for all
players. Considering a normal, unbiased system as a refer-
ence, Fig. 4(a) shows the change for all invasions when we
apply biased populations. Here ∆ρC shows how the success-
ful invasion steps increasing the cooperation level change if
we replace an unbiased system by a biased model. Similarly
∆ρD denotes how the frequency of successful defector inva-
sion steps varies when we change a normal system to a biased
one. As expected, the strategy invasions are more intensive
for an underconfident population, hence the changes of suc-
cessful invasion steps are positive for both strategies. But the
increment for cooperator strategy is larger than for defector
strategy. It simply means that the cooperator invasion in a nor-
mal system is so weak that the general increment of adoption
skill for underconfident players provides a significant support
for C strategy. On the other hand, the invasion success of de-
fection is so strong in a normal system that it does not give
relevant additional support for D strategy when we use un-
derconfident players who adopt neighboring strategies more
easily.
Also in agreement with our expectation the general strategy
invasion is reduced for the overconfident population, hence
the change is negative compared to the normal system. But
again, the levels of change for different strategies are strik-
ingly different. While the cooperator invasion decreases just
slightly, the decline of defector invasion is significant when
we replace a normal system by an overconfident population.
In other words, defectors loose more when we lower the gen-
eral adoption capacity because their success in a normal sys-
tem is significant while cooperator players are rather unsuc-
cessful.
While Fig. 4 (a) shows the change of successful strategy
invasions compared to a normal system, panel (b) of Fig. 4
shows the sum of defector and cooperator invasions for all uni-
form systems. As expected, defectors are more successful for
all T values in all cases, but the success of defectors is signifi-
cantly weakened for both biased systems compared to the nor-
mal system which is also plotted here. Albeit the evolutionary
consequences are similar, but their explanations are different.
When underconfident players are used, their general willing-
ness to change strategy moves the evolutionary dynamics to-
ward a more neutral direction, hence the individual advantage
of defection is less straightforward. Consequently, the mi-
croscopic dynamics that are less deterministic can be detected
from the irregular, noisy patterns of domains we already noted
in Fig. 3 (b). In the presence of overconfident players all mi-
croscopic changes are suppressed in general, but cooperators
can benefit more from this fact. Indeed, network reciprocity
is strengthened and the phalanx of C becomes more robust
which is hardly broken by defectors even for a significantly
higher temptation. Therefore the borders of cooperator do-
mains become smooth, and the C domains are more compact,
as illustrated in Fig. 3 (b). This observation fits nicely into the
general expectation that a microscopic rule which strengthens
surface tension and smooth separating domain walls could be
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FIG. 5: Optimal cooperation levels for square lattice at T = 1.1 by
using different K values, as indicated. On the x-axis α′ = α/K
is a normalized parameter for proper comparison. The inset shows
the related invasion probability functions dependent on payoff differ-
ences for the specific K values. This function converges to a linear
function as we increase K.
beneficial for the evolution of cooperation [23, 48, 49].
As we argued, the reason why biased populations support
cooperation is based on the fact that the intervention into the
microscopic dynamics has asymmetric consequences on strat-
egy invasions. Due to the strongly non-linear character of in-
vasion probability, defined by Eq. 1, a slight advantage of a
higher temptation value results in a dramatic advantage for
defectors that cannot be stated about cooperators whose pay-
off can hardly exceed a defector’s value. This argument can
be tested easily because if we apply a less non-linear inva-
sion probability function then the consequence of strategy-
neutral intervention should be less biased, which would re-
sult in a mitigated cooperator supporting effect. Interestingly,
a less non-linear probability function can be reached even in
the framework of the used Fermi-function if we use higher
noise values. This is illustrated in the inset of Fig. 5 where
the originally step-like, strongly non-linear function tends to a
linear function as we increaseK . The main plot of Fig. 5 con-
firms our expectation because by increasing the noise value at
a fixed temptation the maximum value of the cooperation level
decreases gradually. What is more, the cooperator supporting
effect completely disappears above a critical noise value. In-
deed, ρC increases for high α values, but this is just a conse-
quence of the artificial effect that too high α would result in a
frozen state which may conserve the initial cooperation level.
Finally, we stress that our observations are not restricted to
a square lattice interaction graph but can also be detected for
other networks. Figure 6 illustrates that a positive impact at
an intermediate α can be seen for other types of lattices, ran-
dom graphs, and even for a highly heterogeneous scale-free
network. The only compelling criterion for the population is
to be structured where network reciprocity can work. Other-
wise, in a well-mixed population, where interactions are just
temporary, we cannot observe the stable coexistence of co-
operator and defector strategies, hence the pattern formations
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FIG. 6: Fraction of cooperators in dependent on α for different in-
teraction graphs as indicated. The applied temptation values are
T = 1.09, 1.14, 1.06, and 1.02, respectively. For proper comparison
all ρC values are normalized with their maximal values. The system
size of heterogeneous graphs are N = 5000 where cooperation lev-
els were averaged over 1000 independently generated configurations.
For regular graphs we usedK = 0.1while for heterogeneous graphs,
where payoff values could be highly diverse, we appliedK = 0.025
to avoid the noise effect we discussed in the previous plot.
discussed in Fig. 3 are invalid.
The other crucial criterion is the non-linear payoff depen-
dence of evolutionary success that is captured by the fre-
quently used Fermi-type invasion probability, but other types
of rules with similar features can also be cited here [50, 51].
Indeed, the non-linear character of evolutionary dynamics is
a broadly assumed and experimentally justified feature for a
broad range of systems including biological, ecological, and
economical examples [52–58].
IV. DISCUSSION
The evolution of cooperation is an intensively studied prob-
lem that has attracted hundreds of research papers propos-
ing many sophisticated strategies and external conditions that
could be helpful to overcome the original conflicts of individ-
ual and collective benefits [59–64]. In the present work we
have studied one of the simplest extensions of the basic pris-
oner’s dilemma game and explored its possible consequences
on the cooperation level.
It turns out that when the self-deception level of players is
biased the general cooperation is elevated. Interestingly, to be
overconfident, that is, to think more about their own achieve-
ment than it is worth in reality, is not just vital individually,
but could also be useful collectively. Similarly, the presence
of underconfident players can demolish the plausible advan-
tage of defection. In both cases we can detect a dynamical
effect that is responsible for this improvement.
The underconfident attitude involves stimulated imitation
of neighbors which results in general coordination of players.
The emergence of locally homogeneous spots, however, di-
rectly supports cooperation strategy because it reveals the ad-
vantage of mutual cooperation. This mechanism can be iden-
tified in those systems where the inequality or heterogeneity
of players were reported as a cooperator promoting circum-
stance. This heterogeneitymay be originated from topological
factors, like the difference between hub and periphery players,
but could also be derived from individual differences. The lat-
ter could be strategy teaching or learning capacity [65], but
also conformity [66, 67] or the willingness to invest heteroge-
neously to different neighbors [68, 69].
Interestingly, overconfident players behave oppositely, they
are reluctant to adopt neighboring strategies, still, the final
outcome is very similar to those we observed for an under-
confident society. In the latter case the aggressive propaga-
tion of successful defectors suffers more from the suppressed
microscopic dynamics. In this way overconfidence attitude
enhances the stability of evolving patterns hence a success-
ful lonely defector cannot break the phalanx of cooperators
even at a reasonably high temptation value. Put differently,
the emergence of an overconfident attitude can enhance the
network reciprocity that is already present in structured pop-
ulations. We stress that the observed behavior is not only the
spreading and final triumph of overconfident players over oth-
ers with different attitude as reported in Ref.[3], but the final
outcome provides a higher well-being of the whole commu-
nity via a higher cooperation level.
It is a common feature of both biased systems that a
strategy-neutral intervention into the dynamics results in a
highly biased impact on the evolution of strategies. This
seemingly paradox behavior was also reported in systems
where the cooperation level was sensitive to the applied dy-
namics [70, 71]. When the dynamic is suppressed, it retards
the successful defector invasion more, while less successful
cooperators benefit more from the stimulated imitations in the
other case. In our present models these biased consequences
are in close relation with the non-linear character of imitation
dynamics that is a frequently observed phenomenon, which is
broadly used in microscopic models.
We hope that the present work gives insight into why over-
confidence is a frequently emerging attitude that has a subtle
impact on the success of the whole community.
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